The Courtroom, Part 1

Court part 1

Court opens with some introductions and then some discussion about the law itself. Go back and look at the law if you need to in order to follow what they are talking about.

Here’s the transcript of that section above.

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ATTORNEY(at the bench quietly to judge): I normally don’t do this, but I’ve got people here on certain things, and I know this is gonna take awhile. Can we get some other stuff done before they start their. . .

JUDGE: Uh, who you got?

ATTORNEY Like I’ve got one lady for an emergency guardianship.

JUDGE: Let’s have her

ATTORNEY: And I’ve got a couple-

JUDGE (announcing to courtroom): I’ve got a couple of matters I’m going to take up before we start with this hearing because of its length. I’ve got a couple of emergency situations, uh –

VIDEO CUTS HERE.

Opens with Lisa and her attorney, Todd Bolus in front on the left of the screen. Eric and Viv are standing behind them with their attorney. Nicole is standing to the right. Joe walks up during the conversation to stand beside Nicole.

JJUDGE: And Mr. Miller, you represent whom?

MILLER: Judge, I represent William Martin and Vivian Adams who are standing here.

JUDGE: Vivian Smith? Or Vivian Martin?

VIV: I’m the same person. That’s because Mrs. Naugler didn’t know my name correctly.

JUDGE: Mr. Miller, you represent who?

MILLER: Both of them.

JUDGE: I’ve got a William Martin also. On my file, on my 37 70 ND 37 [edit: or some number like that]

JOE: That would be the one I filed against him.

JUDGE: That’s Joseph Naugler vs. William Martin

JOE: Yes ma’am.

BOLUS: And your honor, just for a point, (unclear) threshold level, number one, we do need separation of witnesses. It is a separate set of allegations as involves Ms. Luthi from the other two – from the other cases. Ms. Luthi’s is only relative to Mrs. Naugler and I would, I would insist on separation of witnesses in Ms. Luthi’s case.

NICOLE: (interrupts) I’m in agreement with that.

JUDGE: I’m sorry, what?

NICOLE: I’m in agreement with that.

JUDGE: Well, anytime anybody asks for separation, the court grants that, so that’s not gonna be a problem. Uh,

BOLUS: And I would also like that, her counts to be severed from the other counts as well.

JUDGE: They are.

BOLUS: Thank you.

JUDGE: As we stand here, they are. Right? I just called you all up together at the same time because I thought included all. I didn’t realize that Mr. Naugler was here too but he’s here and it’s okay so we’ll talk about those matters at this moment, because I understood a moment ago that you all had some preliminary motions that you were going to make, uh, and so we can talk about those preliminary matters without a separation of witnesses, can we not, gentlemen?

Mrs. Naugler –

Hold on, one more thing. Help me out, sir. Your name is?

BOLUS: Todd Bolus B-O-L-U-S

JUDGE: Yeah, but I didn’t know who he was so

[laughter from group]

JUDGE: I just like to know who’s on first

Are you from Elizabethtown, sir?

BOLUS: No, ma’am. I’m from Louisville.

JUDGE: And then, Mr. Miller, and, and, [judge is writing notes] (unclear) this is on Luthi. . . and then, Mr. Miller, you’re on not only, uh, Ms. Smith but Mr. Martin?

MILLER: Correct.

JUDGE: So, and Mr. and Mrs. Naugler are also here today and, interestingly, these cases were all transferred from Hardin County, is that what I’m hearing, been told?

BOLUS: Some were, Your Honor.

MILLER: Our two, Your Honor, and that was my initial motion.

JUDGE: Those are your two cases, that are transferred?

MILLER: Yes.

BOLUS: We objected . . .

JUDGE: So, three of four are transferred from Hardin County?

BOLUS: What happened, Your Honor, I had initially made a motion with regard to the jurisdictional requirements of the statute, as the Court is aware, the IPO statute is very precise. Because it provides an attenuated proceeding, what it does, is we have a very rigid set of standards. In that set of standards is a requirement that it be filed in the county in which the purported victim resides. That wasn’t Hardin County in the case of Ms. Luthi’s case, and Mrs. Naugler had not, had not fled to Hardin County, uh, in order to escape the, the, what she claimed was occurring to her.

That meant that this case had to come back here to Hardinsburg. What winds up occurring is that Judge Addington first signs the order dismissing the case which was the order which I tended with my motion, which was the appropriate order, but then she, then she issues a subsequent order simply transferring the case.

Our position on the Hardin County is that that case is actually dismissed by the operation of law. The court was not empowered to go ahead and reinstate it on her own motion.

JUDGE: She didn’t set it aside?

BOLUS: Correct.

[Some talking over]

JUDGE: (To JOE) Just a minute, just a minute, Mr. Naugler. You’re actually not in that case.

[JOE continues to try to talk]

BOLUS: He is not an attorney, Your Honor. If he were licensed. . .

NICOLE: I filed an independent protection order here in Breckinridge County several weeks ago, so my protection order against Ms. Luthi has been filed in Hardin County and in Breckinridge County. The one in Hardin County was either dismissed or transferred, um, I have not gotten the documents on that exactly, um, in the mail yet.

JUDGE: (To Nicole) Hold on. . .

(To Bolus) What you were saying was that there was Trailer One and Trailer Two, and Trailer One was the dismissed case from Hardin County.

BOLUS: I’m not sure which Trailer is which Trailer

JUDGE: Trailer One is the one Mrs. Naugler speaks of and Trailer Two is the one that was dismissed (speaking to the clerk)

BOLUS: Right, so Trailer Two would be the. . .

CLERK: [unclear]

BOLUS: Right, it was simply issued as a summons.

JUDGE: So then Trailer Two is the Hardin County matter that was dismissed by Judge Addington and we’re going to maintain its dismissal because I have absolutely no authority over dismissed cases.

NICOLE: Ms. Addington told me, her office told me that it was transferred. So if it hasn’t, that’s fine, because I filed one here in Breckinridge County and if I need to file one against Ms. Adams as well here in Breckinridge County, I can do so.

JUDGE: Mrs. Naugler, if both of the matters are talking about the same time frame and the same allegations, it would be redundant for us to have both, wouldn’t it?

NICOLE: Right. I’m just saying that if one’s dismissed, then I can. . .

JUDGE: If one is dismissed, then the other stands, so we don’t need both against Ms. Luthi. Do we?

NICOLE: Correct. I was referring to another case. I apologize.

JUDGE: So I’m trying to clean up a little bit of house first before we try to get, so I can get it clear for me, because this is kind of an unusual set of facts I’m looking at, I think.

BOLUS: Yes, Your Honor. And so, and so that’s our position with regard to the Trailer Two case. I have further requests with regard to the Trailer One case, but I think as the court is dealing with this particular housekeeping matter, I think it’s appropriate for us to do the housekeeping first, but before I get into my more substantive. . .

JUDGE: It is the same set of facts, correct, folks, on Trailer One and Trailer Two?

NICOLE: Correct.

BOLUS: As I’ve read the. . .

JUDGE: Then in fact, it . . . I’m not gonna hear two cases on the same set of facts, so I’m going to dismiss the transfer. Whether it should have been or should not have been, I’m doing it anyway. Okay?

So we can just have the one case.

So on Trailer Two, which is the, uh, Hardin County, 17-D-33 Trailer Two, that’s gone. That leaves you, sir, uh, the Trailer One.

BOLUS: And I do have some requests with regard to Trailer One. And I’m gonna make a motion with regard to rule 12 as a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Basically, as I, as I have reviewed the allegations in the petition versus the requirements according to the statute, she’s missing the very most important part which is the reference to the stalking statute. She doesn’t make the allegations that are required in this attenuated process for this order.

This was a set of orders which was, which was intended to address very severe, very fast, very hard items between people, ideally in some form of romantic relationship. Unfortunately, there was a rather large hole that the General Assembly left in the statute where people who weren’t in that kind of relationship could wind up using them. Nonetheless, there’s very specific statutory requirement in this proceeding which does require that there be violations, specifically under the stalking statutes, whether first or second degree, and I’m not reading it in the allegations that she’s set forth.

JUDGE: Get your green book and show me what’s required.

MILLER: Todd, I have that. . .

BOLUS: Have you got it? A little more convenient.

JUDGE: Do we have a copy for Mrs. Naugler?

MILLER: I did not make a separate set of copies.

MILLER goes with the green book to share it with NICOLE.

BOLUS: As the court may review in the statute, it requires a reference under, I think it’s 508.010. The statute on stalking. It requires allegations with regard to death, serious physical harm, or sexual assault, under the sexual, under the sexual abuse statutes. And those are absolutely mandatory under the, under the statutory scheme that she has chosen to proceed under. As a result of that, because she makes no allegations with regard to the statutory requirement, I think that under the circumstances, rule 12 would require that the matter be dismissed.

And that if the court, and furthermore, I would add one other thing, that, you know, to the extent that she’s gonna raise allegations that aren’t going to those things, until and unless she actually makes those allegations, a motion in limiting should be promulgated prohibiting her from talking about any other episodes.

JUDGE: Well, Mr. Bolus, I don’t know how frequently you practice down in the country but here’s the thing. We don’t have domestic violence advocates that have offices in the courthouse directing our plaintiffs how to file and, uh, uh, helping them to have all the statutory requirements. Now, if you’re telling me that the TIPO statute

[To NICOLE: Ma’am, just a minute. Let me speak.]

Um, that the TIPO statute requires her to make these allegations, I’m gonna read it, and if it requires her to do it and she hasn’t done it, then I’m gonna rule in your favor on that. I don’t know that it actually is gonna require her to include that, so what we ordinarily do, is we try to give some latitude to petitioners in our cases because they don’t have the advantages of people, uh, that live in the city to have that assistance from people who work the cases daily.

So, if you’re gonna, you’re telling me that she’s got to specifically allege that in her petition under the TIPO statute, I’m happy to look at that. Show me. . .

BOLUS: Your Honor, the reason why I say that is that even in a proceeding as, as narrow and attenuated as this one, I think that there does come a requirement that people have as to certain due process, to be able to respond appropriately. That’s why the statute is very direct in terms of what is required, what level of, of, conduct is required , and I think she has to make some allegations regarding . .. .

JUDGE: Well, I’m not necessarily disagreeing that she has to make some sort of allegation that is gonna support or at least allude to something of that degree but I’m just gonna have to read and see, um, and you know, you’ve seen today, I’ve kinda been busy most of the morning, and it was that way, or the afternoon and it was that way this morning, so, and I wasn’t here yesterday, or the day before, or the day before, or the day before, so I don’t know these. I’ve never looked at them before until now, so I’m going to have to make those calls at this point, and you wanted to respond, Mrs. Naugler?

NICOLE: Yes. It says here 456.030 Petition for Interpersonal Protective Order. A petition for interpersonal protective order may be filed by, number B would be a victim of stalking.

Statute 508.130 says definition means to stalk means to engage in an intentional course of conduct directed at a specific person or persons which seriously alarms, annoys, intimidates, harasses the person and which serves no legitimate purpose.

That would be, and in B it says that the course of conduct shall be that which causes a reasonable person to suffer substantial distress. Mental distress.

Um, that’s 508.130. I don’t have it printed out, but I do have it referenced on my phone to the KRS.

JOE: And a lot of what we’re referencing. . .

BOLUS: Your Honor

JUDGE: Mr. Naugler, in all honesty, I wouldn’t let anybody else speak other than her. You can’t counsel her because you don’t have a. . . you can’t be her attorney. You can sit with her and support her, and you can speak on your case, but as far as making argument of law, he’s correct (pointing to BOLUS), you can’t do that. If you want to hire counsel, she could, counsel could assist with that, but you can’t do that at this point. Okay,Mr. Naugler?

All right. So, um, let me read the facts, first. Okay?

I’ll be doing all of this in segments over the next few days, as I can get them transcribed. This is public information. It’s a readily available video. Anyone who wishes can obtain a copy. Nobody’s “rights” are being infringed upon here. It was a public hearing.

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